Comparing Mnangagwa’s Repression to Rhodesian

There were high hopes for reform when President Emmerson Mnangagwa came to power in 2017.

Ultimately, the military takeover that ended Robert Mugabe’s long-standing dictatorial authority served as a catalyst for his rising.

But as the years have passed, it has become more and more obvious that, like the promises made by other authoritarian governments in southern Africa, the hopes placed in Mnangagwa’s leadership have mostly fallen short.

The comparisons made between Ian Smith’s notorious dictatorship in Rhodesia and the apartheid state in South Africa and Mnangagwa’s government serve as a sobering reminder of how little has changed in Zimbabwe’s political repression landscape.

The Mnangagwa regime, albeit operating under the pretense of democracy, is essentially a mirror image of these previous institutions, employing the same techniques of repression.

Mnangagwa’s contempt for political opposition is the driving force behind this crackdown.

His government’s strategy seems to be a deliberate attempt to crush opposition through the use of state apparatuses evocative of Ian Smith’s methods from the 1960s and 1970s.

Smith’s Rhodesian regime and the current one are remarkably similar in that they both methodically suppressed Black Zimbabweans’ political ambitions.

Today’s severe political techniques are uncannily similar to those used by Smith’s time, including outlawing opposition groups and stifling political forums.

Pretrial detentions, kidnappings, and the deliberate infiltration of opposition movements are cited by Mnangagwa’s detractors as unmistakable proof that the president’s pledges of a “new Zimbabwe” have not materialized but rather have brought back the harsh past.

In a recent interview, former parliamentarian Job Sikhala harshly criticized Mnangagwa’s administration, drawing comparisons between its policies and those of Rhodesia under Smith and South Africa during apartheid.

Sikhala stated that the atmosphere Mnangagwa fostered is identical to the terrible persecution that marked the regimes of the 1960s and 1970s. Sikhala himself spent approximately 600 days in remand prison.

African nationalism was brutally suppressed during that time by South Africa’s apartheid leaders, including de Klerk, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) was banned.

According to Sikhala, the opposition may be forced underground, much like the resistance movements of the past, because the political space in Zimbabwe has been so stifled.

He cautions that this might result in a significantly more hazardous and unstable political environment.

Given this, it is imperative to inquire as to what accomplishments has Mnangagwa’s administration made and how it stacks up against the colonial administrations that preceding Zimbabwe’s independence.

Undoubtedly, Mnangagwa’s administration oversaw certain achievements, especially in the field of infrastructure.

In addition to various programs aiming at economic revitalization, roads have been restored.

For example, the government’s emphasis on mining, especially lithium and gold, has attracted attention from around the world, and initiatives have been made to interact with the international community for economic collaborations.

These successes, nevertheless, are eclipsed by the actual situation.

Even with the construction of roads, Zimbabweans’ political freedom is still severely restricted, and the country is still largely instilled with dread.

A thorough examination of each leader’s methods for maintaining power is also necessary for a fair comparison between the Smith and Mnangagwa administrations.

Ian Smith’s administration was notorious for its ruthless effectiveness in quelling any kind of opposition.

Similar to how the current administration uses kidnappings and pretrial detentions to keep political opponents in check, his employment of laws like the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act was specifically intended to eliminate political dissent.

Additionally, Mnangagwa’s administration has demonstrated a concerning propensity to employ state apparatus as means of coercion, particularly the police, military, and Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).

These troops are frequently called upon to put down demonstrations, silence dissenting opinions, and uphold ZANU-PF’s hold on power.

When we take into account the cultural and sociological parallels between the Smith and Mnangagwa regimes, the connection becomes even more troubling.

Both politicians have come under fire for allegedly creating an environment that benefits just the ruling class and disenfranchises the vast majority of people.

The best land, jobs, and economic prospects were assured to the favored few under Smith’s white minority rule.

A similar dynamic exists under Mnangagwa, although with a different ruling elite.

Large portions of the economy are controlled by Zimbabwe’s political elite, who are strongly associated with ZANU-PF, while the general populace faces hyperinflation, unemployment, and poverty.

Sikhala’s claim that political repression has driven the masses “underground” is a warning as much as an observation.

Suppressing political involvement naturally leads to opposition groups regrouping out of the public eye, which makes them more harder to track and interact with.

The African National Congress (ANC) was a powerful political force in South Africa before going underground during the apartheid era.

Similar to this, before overthrowing colonial control in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF itself was a covert liberation organization.

It’s possible that the Mnangagwa government’s denial of the opposition a legitimate forum is planting the seeds for a similar insurgent movement, and past experience has shown that once mobilized, these movements may Zimbabwe hard to contain.

It is evident that the same systems of power and control are in place under Mnangagwa’s administration as they were under the colonial and apartheid governments in southern Africa.

Mnangagwa’s leadership was characterized by the same practices as that of Smith and de Klerk: the concentration of money and power in the hands of a few, the use of state brutality to preserve political control, and the suppression of dissent.

Although Mnangagwa has succeeded in producing a surface level of development, especially in the area of economic projects, the fundamental problems of political freedom and human rights have not been addressed.

But it’s crucial to remember that Mnangagwa’s administration has advanced diplomatically, particularly in luring investment from nations like China.

His administration’s foreign policy initiatives have been centered around the slogan “Zimbabwe is Open for Business,” with varying degrees of success.

However, even in this area, genuine advancement has been hampered by the lingering political repression domestically and the legacy of mistrust from the Mugabe era.

Investors are leery of nations where there is a strong likelihood of civil disturbance and where the rule of law seems to be administered selectively.

It is not only rhetorical to draw parallels between Mnangagwa’s government and the repressive governments of Ian Smith and apartheid-era South Africa; rather, these comparisons reveal a profound structural continuity in the distribution of power in Zimbabwe.

A larger legacy of repression is shown by the president’s handling of opposition, his reliance on state apparatus to keep power, and his government’s disregard for the rights and needs of common Zimbabweans.

Even if Mnangagwa may have supervised some economic success, the general disenchantment of the populace indicates that his government is, for the most part, a perpetuation of the very oppressive systems that Zimbabwe fought to overturn.

It would need a fundamental change in government that puts political freedom and inclusivity first in order for Zimbabwe to actually break free from this pattern.

Then and only then will the nation be able to turn away from its colonial past and begin to fulfill the promise of independence.

More: The Zim Bulletin